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OPINION OF THE COURT 




SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 
 Cavert Acquisition Company has petitioned for review of 
the order of the National Labor Relations Board (Board) 
compelling it to bargain with the United Mine Workers of America, 
AFL-CIO (Union); the Union has cross-petitioned for enforcement 
of the Board's order.  The underlying dispute concerns a union 
election that was held in 1993 to determine whether certain 
Cavert employees should be represented by the Union. 
Specifically, Cavert challenges the Board's ruling that an 
employee who had been out of work for five months due to an 
injury was eligible to vote.  Cavert argues first that the Board 
applied the wrong standard in reaching the eligibility 
determination and, alternatively, that the standard was 
improperly applied in this case. 
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 I.  
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A.  
                     Election and Aftermath 
 Cavert Acquisition Company1 is a manufacturer of steel 
wire.  On December 21 and 22, 1993, pursuant to a stipulated 
election agreement entered into between Cavert and the Union, the 
Board conducted an election among production and maintenance 
employees at Cavert's manufacturing plant in North Union 
Township, Pennsylvania, to determine whether they should be 
represented by the Union. 
 During the election the Board agent conducting the 
election objected to the ballot of Larry Morris because his name 
did not appear on the eligibility list submitted by Cavert. 
Morris had been absent from work since a work-related injury five 
months earlier.  The Union challenged the ballots of two 
employees on the ground that they were supervisors and therefore 
excluded from the bargaining unit.  A tally of the uncontested 
ballots yielded 16 in favor of the Union and 14 opposed.  The 
three contested ballots were therefore potentially determinative 
of the election's outcome. 
 Pursuant to an order of the Acting Regional Director of 
the Board, a hearing was held before a hearing officer concerning 
the challenged ballots.  The hearing officer's report recommended 
                     
1When this dispute first arose, the name of the employer was 
Cavert Wire Company.  On August 23, 1994, the company was 
purchased and the business was continued in unchanged form under 
the name Cavert Acquisition Co., d/b/a Cavert Wire Company. 
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that all three challenges be overruled and the ballots opened and 
counted.  Cavert and the Union filed exceptions.  The Board then 
issued an order adopting the findings and recommendations of the 
hearing officer and directing that the disputed ballots be 
counted.  The revised tally was 17 in favor of the Union and 16 
opposed.  Accordingly, on August 4, 1994 the Board certified the 
Union as the employees' exclusive collective bargaining 
representative. 
 Following certification, Cavert refused to bargain with 
the Union, claiming that the certification was invalid because of 
the inclusion of Morris's vote.  The Union subsequently filed an 
unfair labor practice charge with the Board.  On motion by the 
Board's General Counsel, the Board granted summary judgment 
against Cavert on April 17, 1995, ordering it to bargain with the 
Union.  The challenges as to the supervisors are no longer in 
dispute, and only Morris's eligibility remains at issue. 
B.  
Larry Morris 
 Morris began working for Cavert in early 1990 and 
worked steadily, apparently as a cross-trained production worker, 
until July 21, 1993, when he fell from a ladder sustaining injury 
to his left leg.  Since the accident he has not worked at Cavert 
or anywhere else.  On the day following the injury, Morris was 
examined by a doctor who gave him a handwritten note stating that 
he would be "unable to work until further notice."  SA. at 6. 
Morris gave this note to Cavert.  Shortly thereafter, Morris 
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filed a workers' compensation claim.  The claim was denied, and 
he filed a timely appeal. 
 Cavert sent Morris a letter dated July 30, 1993 
informing him that his medical benefits would be terminated as of 
September 1, 1993 and advising him that under the Consolidated 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA), 29 U.S.C. § 1161-68, 
he had the right to continue his benefits at his own expense. 
With the letter, Cavert enclosed a form it had prepared for 
employees that listed five "qualifying events" that would permit 
an employee whose group health benefits would end as a result of 
the event to elect to continue coverage.  The only event arguably 
applicable to Morris was "[t]ermination of the employee's 
employment . . . or reduction of hours worked which renders the 
employee ineligible for coverage."  App. at 135.  Morris did not 
take any action in response to this letter, and his medical 
insurance ended on September 1, 1993. 
 In the weeks following the accident, Morris phoned 
Cavert a number of times to ask about his workers' compensation 
claim and to request paperwork relating to his car insurance.  He 
also visited the plant several times in an effort to obtain the 
needed paperwork.  After the executive assistant to Aaron 
Swimmer, Cavert's chief executive officer, told him some time in 
September 1993 to stop calling or visiting the facility, Morris 
had no further contact with Cavert other than one visit three 
months later to retrieve a radio from his locker. 
   In his testimony before the hearing officer, Swimmer 
stated that Morris was removed from the payroll after his injury, 
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App. at 82; that removal did not necessarily indicate that he was 
no longer an employee, since Cavert also removes from the payroll 
employees who are temporarily absent on sick leave or vacation, 
App. at 84-85; but that an employee's absence from the payroll in 
conjunction with a COBRA letter did constitute termination, id. 
 Swimmer further testified that Morris's position was 
not filled until 30 to 60 days after his injury; that Swimmer 
worked with the other employees until then, hoping Morris would 
return; App. at 69-70, 87; and that although Cavert's personnel 
handbook states that insurance coverage is not terminated until 
an employee has been absent from work for three months, Swimmer 
had the COBRA letter about insurance coverage termination sent to 
Morris just nine days after his injury because he viewed Morris's 
workers' compensation claim as "questionable" and was hoping the 
letter would persuade Morris to drop the claim and come back to 
work.  SA. at 4. 
 Morris was sent to an independent physician in 
connection with his workers' compensation claim.  That doctor 
issued a report dated September 2, 1993 releasing Morris for 
light duty, and the workers' compensation carrier informed Cavert 
of that report sometime in September 1993.  Swimmer testified 
that if Morris had requested it at that time, he would have given 
him light duty work, App. at 87-89, but Morris testified that he 
was never informed that the doctor had released him for light 
duty, and that none of the other doctors he had seen since the 
accident had released him to work, either for light or regular 
duty.  App. at 24, 102. 
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 Based in part on credibility determinations, the 
hearing officer rejected the challenge to Morris's ballot.  The 
Board was unanimous in both its opinion adopting the hearing 
officer's recommendation and its opinion granting summary 
judgment on the finding that Cavert committed an unfair labor 
practice.  This court has jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) & 
(f) over Cavert's petition for review and the Board's cross-




Board Rule for Eligibility to Vote 
 As the Supreme Court has made clear in the context of a 
case considering a challenge to employee ballots cast in a union 
representation election, it is the Board that has the statutory 
authority to define bargaining units.  See NLRB v. Action 
Automotive, Inc., 469 U.S. 490, 494 (1985).  That authority is 
explicit in section 9(b) of the National Labor Relations Act. Id. 
The Board has exercised that authority by focusing on whether the 
employees permitted to participate in the privileges of a 
bargaining unit, including voting, share a community of interest. 
See Action Automotive, 469 U.S. at 494; South Prairie Constr. Co. 
v. Local 627, Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, 425 U.S. 800, 
805 (1976).   
 In general, an employee who is employed on the last day 
of the preceding payroll period and on the day of the election is 
eligible to vote in a certification election.  See NLRB v. Newly 
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Weds Foods, Inc., 758 F.2d 4, 7 (1st Cir. 1985); Robert A. 
Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law 43 (1976).  Because the 
bookkeeping and payroll practices of employers differ, the Board 
has developed rules for determining when employees in different 
circumstances share the community of interest requisite for 
eligibility to vote in an election. 
  Central to the issue in this case is the Board's rule 
that distinguishes between the manner in which voting eligibility 
is proven for employees who are on layoff at the time of an 
election and those who are out for medical reasons.  It has long 
been the Board rule that a laid-off employee who, on the day of 
the election, has a "reasonable expectation" of returning to work 
is eligible to vote.  Higgins, Inc., 111 N.L.R.B. 797, 799 
(1955).  In contrast, the Board rule is that employees absent 
from work for medical reasons are presumed to continue in 
employment status and remain eligible to vote "unless and until 
the presumption is rebutted by an affirmative showing that the 
employee has been discharged or has resigned."  Red Arrow Freight 
Lines, Inc., 278 N.L.R.B. 965 (1986).  Cavert's principal 
argument is that the Board's distinction between laid-off 
employees and those out for medical reasons is unreasonable and 
"unprincipled," and it argues for application of the "reasonable 
expectation" rule to Morris. 
 Apparently because Cavert recognizes that the rule is 
well within the Board's powers, Cavert fires its principal attack 
on the application of any deference to the Board's rule.  The 
Board, not surprisingly, argues that we should accord the usual 
9 
deference both to its formulation of rules and its evaluation of 
the facts in a particular case. 
B. 
Deference to be Accorded the Board Rule 
 In general, unless an issue is governed by an 
unambiguous statutory provision, courts must defer to an agency's 
interpretation of a statute it has been entrusted to administer. 
Thus, the function for the court is not to impose its own 
interpretation of the statute, but simply to determine whether 
the agency's interpretation "is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute."  INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 
421, 445 n.29 (1987).  The agency's interpretation will be "given 
controlling weight unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or 
manifestly contrary to the statute." Id. 
 In particular, in considering the validity of standards 
and rules developed by the Board, courts must accord the Board 
substantial deference because of its special expertise in 
"applying the general provisions of the [National Labor 
Relations] Act to the complexities of industrial life."  NLRB v. 
Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963).  This same 
principle is applied to rules developed by the Board through the 
adjudicatory process.  See, e.g., NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 
420 U.S. 251, 266-67 (1975) (rules developed and applied by Board 
subject to limited judicial review and upheld as long as 
"permissible" under the statute); see also Jamesway Corp. v. 
NLRB, 676 F.2d 63, 67 (3d Cir. 1982) (court reviews policies and 
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procedures established by Board for conduct of elections under 
abuse of discretion standard). 
 Cavert argues that our review is plenary, because the 
standard enunciated in Red Arrow has been inconsistently applied 
by the Board. It refers us to the Supreme Court's opinion in 
Cardoza-Fonseca, where the Court, in reviewing the general 
principles according deference to an agency, stated that where an 
agency's position "conflicts with [its] earlier interpretation 
[it] is 'entitled to considerably less deference' than a 
consistently held agency view."  Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 446 
n.30 (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273 (1981)). 
 At issue in that case was the standard of proof to be 
applied to the statutory provision authorizing the Attorney 
General to grant asylum to an alien.  After concluding that the 
statutory language and history did not support the government's 
then current interpretation that establishment of "a clear 
probability of persecution" was the same as showing a "well-
founded fear of persecution," the Court noted this was "a pure 
question of statutory construction for the courts to decide." Id. 
at 446.  It also noted in a footnote that the Bureau of 
Immigration Appeals had answered the question in at least three 
different ways, had a "long pattern of erratic treatment of this 
issue," and "even today does not completely agree, with the INS's 
litigation position that the two standards are equivalent."  Id. 
at 447 n.30.  Because the holding which gave decreased deference 
to the agency was primarily based on the Court's interpretation 
of the statutory language and history, the prior inconsistency in 
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the agency's interpretation may have played only a minor role, if 
any, in the Court's decision. 
 Moreover, Cardoza-Fonseca was not a labor case, and  
the Supreme Court has been particularly cautious in the labor 
field, recognizing that the development of standards by the Board 
is an "evolutionary process," and that the Board will "modif[y] 
and reform[] its standards on the basis of accumulating 
experience" and in light of changing industrial practices. 
Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 674 (1961).  As the 
Court recognized in Weingarten, "[t]o hold that the Board's 
earlier decisions froze the development of this important aspect 
of the national labor law would misconceive the nature of 
administrative decisionmaking."  420 U.S. at 265-66.  Thus, in 
Weingarten the Court approved a rule developed by the Board that 
departed from a number of its prior cases.  Accordingly, the mere 
fact that the Board may have had an inconsistent position in the 
past does not necessarily signify that it should be accorded no 
judicial deference.  
 Cavert relies primarily on some dicta in the majority 
opinion of this court in NLRB v. Economics Laboratory, Inc., 857 
F.2d 931, 935 (3d Cir. 1988).  In that case, we reversed the 
Board's determination that employees who were on long-term 
disability were still entitled to vote.  Although we noted in 
passing that several of the employer's arguments had "much to 
commend them," and stated in that context that "[i]t is not clear 
that the Red Arrow test deserves judicial deference," we 
immediately thereafter stated that "we need not reach these 
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issues" because the factual issue was dispositive.  Id. at 935. 
Significantly, therefore, the case was decided using the Red 
Arrow standard. 
       Moreover, following our decision in Economics 
Laboratory, the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Curtin Matheson 
Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775 (1990), once again reiterated its 
position that "we will uphold a Board rule as long as it is 
rational and consistent with the Act, Fall River [Dyeing & 
Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 42 (1987)], even if we 
would have formulated a different rule had we sat on the Board, 
Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 
413, 418 (1982)."  494 U.S. at 787.  The Court emphasized the 
policy of deference notwithstanding some prior inconsistency, 
citing Weingarten for the proposition that "a Board rule is 
entitled to deference even if it represents a departure from the 
Board's prior policy."  Id. (emphasis added). 
 Nor are we convinced that the Board's rule would not be 
entitled to deference even if there had been some inconsistency 
or vacillation by the Board in applying the "rebuttable 
presumption rule" to the eligibility of "sick leave" employees 
before the Board clearly enunciated its position in its 1986 Red 
Arrow decision.  In NLRB v. Newly Weds Foods, Inc., 758 F.2d 4 
(1st Cir. 1985), then Judge, now Justice, Breyer surveyed the 
available case law and found that notwithstanding "a surprising 
lack of uniformity in the relevant materials, with some cases 
[including court as well as Board] speaking of 'reasonable 
expectations,' some referring to a 'presumption' of employment in 
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the absence of communicated termination, and some speaking of 
both, we have found a basic coherence in the Board's approach." 
Id. at 8 (citations omitted). 
 Judge Breyer's historical survey led him to note that 
more than thirty years before, the Board had stated that under 
its practice, "'an employee on sick leave . . . is eligible to 
vote in an election.'"  758 F.2d at 8 (quoting Whiting 
Corporation, 99 N.L.R.B. 117, 123, rev'd, 200 F. 2d 43 (7th Cir. 
1952)).  This standard is not substantially dissimilar to the one 
the Board applies today.  As Judge Breyer recognized, the Board 
in Whiting clarified that where it was difficult to ascertain 
whether an employee has lost or retained status as an employee, 
it applied the "'reasonable expectation of further employment' 
standard as an aid in resolving the question."  Id. (quoting 
Whiting, 99 N.L.R.B. at 123) (emphasis in Newly Weds).   Based on 
this clarification, Judge Breyer then noted:  
 
According to this standard, the Board uses the 
"reasonable expectations" of 'sick leave' employees 
only to clarify ambiguities of employment status.  The 
administrative need for such a standard is sufficiently 
plausible to support the conclusion that this rule lies 
within the agency's statutory powers. 
 
Id. 
 When the Seventh Circuit reversed the Board's decision 
in Whiting on the ground that the Board's factual finding that 
the employee was eligible to vote was clearly against the weight 
of the evidence, it commented in a cursory paragraph at the end 
of the opinion that the reasonable expectation test was "well-
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established."  200 F.2d at 45.  The court was mistaken because 
the Board cases to which it cited dealt almost exclusively with 
layoffs rather than medical leave.  See id. at 45.  As Judge 
Breyer commented, the court and the Board "passed like ships in 
the night."  Newly Weds Foods, 758 F.2d at 9. 
 It was this error that may have led a number of courts 
to conclude that the reasonable expectation test applies to 
employees on sick leave.  See NLRB v. New England Lithographic 
Co., 589 F.2d 29, 32 (1st Cir. 1978); Lake City Foundry Co. v. 
NLRB, 432 F.2d 1162, 1170 (7th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Atkinson 
Dredging Co., 329 F.2d 158, 161, (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 
U.S. 965 (1964).  We accord these cases little weight, 
particularly in light of a later Seventh Circuit decision holding 
that the rebuttable presumption test (which Cavert denominates 
"unprincipled") is "well-established Board law."  Medline Indus., 
Inc. v. NLRB, 593 F.2d 788, 791 (7th Cir. 1979). 
 Notwithstanding the statement in the Seventh Circuit's 
Whiting decision to the contrary, there is a line of Board cases 
going back to the 1950's holding that employees on sick leave 
were eligible to vote unless they had quit or been discharged, 
see, e.g., Otarion Listener Corp., 124 N.L.R.B. 880, 881 (1959); 
L. D. McFarland Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 577, 578 (1958); Sylvania 
Electric Prod., Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 824, 832 (1957); Foley Mfg. 
Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1205, 1206 (1956); Wright Mfg. Co., 106 
N.L.R.B. 1234, 1236-37 (1953), albeit one also finds an 
occasional detour in the Board's use of language, see Sexton 
Welding Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 454, 456 (1951) (since employer took no 
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steps to discharge sick employee, he had "reasonable expectation" 
of continued employment).  Apparently it was in Miami Rivet Co., 
147 N.L.R.B. 470, 483 (1964), that the Board first characterized 
its standard of proof for voting in terms of a "presumption," 
stating that "an employee who is inactive on sick leave is 
presumed to continue in that status until recovery and . . . the 
party seeking to overcome that presumption must make an 
affirmative showing that the employee has resigned or that the 
employer has earlier discharged him." Id. at 483.  In the 1970's 
the Board's own internal guidelines also clearly endorsed the 
rebuttable presumption test.  See Office of General Counsel, 
Outline of Law and Procedure in Representation Cases 284 (1974) 
(cited in Newly Weds Foods, 758 F.2d at 7).   
 Admittedly, despite this seemingly clear formulation of 
the rule, some subsequent Board decisions made reference to 
reasonable expectations in evaluating the voting eligibility of 
employees absent due to illness.  See Price's Pic-Pac 
Supermarkets, Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. 742, 743 (1981), enf'd 707 F.2d 
236 (6th Cir. 1983); Cato Show Printing Co., 219 N.L.R.B. 739, 
754 (1975).  Thus, when the Board made another attempt in Red 
Arrow to clarify the rule, by stating that the rebuttable 
presumption standard is "[t]he fundamental rule governing the 
eligibility of an employee on sick or maternity leave," 278 
N.L.R.B. at 965, it explained that the use of the phrase 
"reasonable expectation of employment" in some prior sick leave 
cases had been simply an "inadvertent" use of language in 
"isolated" cases.  Id. at 965 n.5. 
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 We have no reason not to accept that explanation, given 
the number of such election issues that have been raised over the 
years, and the changes in Board personnel.  Indeed, we can think 
of few appellate courts that have spoken on any issue over the 
years with precise consistency of language.  We find most 
significant that in the nine years since the Red Arrow decision 
there has been virtual consistency in application of the 
rebuttable presumption rule--now denominated as the "Red Arrow 
test."  See Mediplex of Connecticut, Inc., 319 NLRB, No. 39, slip 
op. at 19 (1995); Monfort, Inc., 318 NLRB, No. 19, slip op. at 1, 
n. 5 (1995); Appalachian Machine and Rebuild Co., 317 NLRB 1343, 
1351 (1995); Virginia Concrete Co., 316 NLRB 261, 267 (1995); 
Pepsi-Cola Co., 315 N.L.R.B. 1322, 1324 (1995); O'Dovero, 315 
N.L.R.B. 1255 (1995); Vanalco, Inc., 315 N.L.R.B. 618 (1994); 
Thorn Americas, Inc., 314 N.L.R.B. 943 (1994); Edward Waters 
College, 307 N.L.R.B. 1321, 1322 (1992); Custom Bent Glass Co., 
304 N.L.R.B. 373, 374 (1991); K. Van Bourgondien & Sons, Inc., 
294 N.L.R.B. 268, 274-75 (1989); Jennings & Web, Inc., 288 
N.L.R.B. 682, 696-97 (1988), enf'd 875 F.2d 315 (4th Cir. 1989); 
Atlanta Dairies Coop., 283 N.L.R.B. 327 (1987).   
 In light of this pattern of rulings, we believe it is 
of little value to engage in the minutiae of a case-by-case 
analysis of each post-Red Arrow case to which Cavert points.  It 
is unclear, for example, whether Advance Waste Systems, Inc., 306 
N.L.R.B. 1020 (1992), Cavert's principal example, was a sick 
leave case or a layoff case, as the Board has denominated it. The 
Board has explicitly "disavow[ed] any construction of Advance 
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Waste Systems as appropriately applying a 'reasonable expectation 
of employment' test to sick leave cases, and we continue to 
adhere to the Red Arrow test."  Pepsi-Cola Co., 315 N.L.R.B. 
1322, 1324 (1995); accord Thorn Americas, Inc., 314 N.L.R.B. 943 
(1994). 
 In the other two post-Red Arrow cases Cavert cites, 
Keeler Brass Automotive Group, 301 N.L.R.B. 769 (1991), and 
Liston Aluminum, 296 N.L.R.B. 1181, 1203 (1989), enf'd 936 F.2d 
578 (9th Cir. 1991), the Board used reasonable expectation 
language but based its determination solely on the fact that 
there had been no affirmative termination of employment.   At 
most, these cases cited by Cavert present minor inconsistencies 
in the Board's otherwise uniform adherence to the rebuttable 
presumption test since its definitive pronouncement in Red Arrow. 
 Cavert makes an additional argument based on the fact 
that certain members of the Board have dissented from application 
of the Red Arrow rule.  We fail to see its relevance, 
particularly in light of the fact that the Board member on whose 
dissents it relies, Member Cohen, was on the Board panels that 
ruled in this case.  Member Cohen joined both the Board's 
unanimous rulings granting summary judgment and adopting the 
recommendation of the hearing officer directing that Morris's 
ballot be counted.  A footnote to that latter Decision and 
Direction states that: 
In agreeing that Larry Morris is an eligible voter, 
Member Cohen finds that, under either of the views 
expressed in Red Arrow Freight Lines, 278 NLRB 965 




App. at 110. 
 Giving the Board rule the appropriate deference, we 
turn therefore to consider whether the Board's Red Arrow test is 
"arbitrary" or "capricious."  INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 
445 n.29.  Clearly it is not.  The Board explains that it favors 
an objective test that is simple, predictable and easily 
administered.  It prefers a "bright-line" rule that avoids 
inquiry into the intentions of the parties or the employee's 
medical prognosis.  The Board is particularly concerned that 
applying the reasonable expectations test to medical leave 
situations would require it to evaluate medical evidence and 
would thereby "open a new avenue of litigation, possibly 
involving paid expert testimony, which is beyond the traditional 
expertise of the agency and inimical to the efficient and 
expeditious resolution of questions concerning representation." 
O'Dovero, 315 N.L.R.B. 1255 n.3 (1995); see also Vanalco, Inc., 
315 N.L.R.B. 618 n.4 (1994) (Red Arrow test avoids "endless 
investigation into states of mind or future prospects" (quoting 
Whiting Corp., 99 N.L.R.B. 117, rev'd 200 F.2d 43 (7th Cir. 
1952))); NLRB v. Staiman Bros., 466 F.2d 564, 566 n.2 (3d Cir. 
1972)(same). 
 The rebuttable presumption test represents a rational 
attempt by the Board to balance the need to make accurate 
determinations as to whether employees share a "community of 
interest" against the necessity to make such determinations 
quickly and definitively so that lengthy disputes regarding union 
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elections can be avoided and employment relations can proceed 
normally, whether through collective bargaining or otherwise.  We 
are not in a position to hold that it was unreasonable for the 
Board to have determined that engaging in fact-finding regarding 
the medical prognosis of employees would be too time-consuming.  
 Cavert's contention that the Board's concerns regarding 
the difficulty of evaluating medical evidence under the 
reasonable expectations test have been largely ameliorated by 
passage of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et 
seq., is unconvincing.  The Act requires an employee taking a 
leave of absence for medical reasons to submit medical 
documentation regarding the reason for the leave and the 
prognosis for return.  Id. § 2613.  We are unpersuaded that the 
requirement that medical documentation be submitted to employers 
will suddenly make such documentation easier for the Board to 
interpret or will preclude the possibility that medical opinions 
concerning an employee's condition or prognosis will conflict. 
Moreover, it is for the Board, not this court, to determine 
whether recent developments in the law warrant a change in its 
standard. 
 We recognize that there may be instances in which it 
may be clear from objective factors that an employee who has been 
out for medical reasons no longer retains the requisite community 
of interest, notwithstanding the failure of either party to 
communicate that termination of employment.  As the Board's 
counsel stated at oral argument, the employer concerned about 
that issue could frame a personnel rule that employees out for 
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medical reasons for a specified period will be considered to have 
been terminated.  In any event, the difficulty that may be 
presented in occasional cases would not justify us in disturbing 
the Board's Red Arrow standard using a rebuttable presumption 
which it, in its expertise, has decided for rational reasons is 
the best approach to determining which employees are eligible to 
vote. 
 Accordingly, we turn to consider whether Cavert has 
presented any reason to disturb the Board's findings in this 
particular case. 
C. 
Substantiality of Evidence to Support the Findings 
 When reviewing the Board's findings of fact or 
application of a valid rule to the facts, we will uphold the 
Board's decision as long as it is supported by substantial 
evidence on the record.  NLRB v. Asbury Graphite Mills, Inc., 832 
F.2d 40, 43 (3d Cir. 1987); NLRB v. Certified Testing Labs., 
Inc., 387 F.2d 275, 277 (3d Cir. 1967).  We consider therefore 
whether there is substantial evidence to support the finding made 
by the hearing officer, and adopted by the Board, App. at 119, 
that "there is no evidence to support the conclusion that [at the 
time of the election] Morris' employment [had] affirmatively been 
terminated."  App. at 103.  Cavert, as the party seeking to 
preclude Morris's vote, bears the burden of proof.  Economics 
Laboratory, 857 F.2d at 936. 
 In general, an affirmative termination of employment in 
this context requires "a manifestation of the intent to terminate 
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which is clearly communicated to the other party."  NLRB v. 
Staiman Bros., 466 F.2d 564, 566 (3d Cir. 1972).  For example, in 
Miami Rivet Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 470, 483 (1964), the Board held 
that an employee out of work due to a heart attack was eligible 
to vote, even though the employer had decided to discharge him, 
because the employer had never communicated that intention to the 
employee prior to the election.  See also Otarion Listener Corp., 
124 N.L.R.B. 880, 881 (1959); Wright Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 1234, 
1236-37 (1953).  Thus, Cavert cannot merely point to its own 
subjective intention or understanding that the employment 
relationship had been terminated to establish an affirmative 
termination. 
 However, it is not necessary that the communication 
that effects the termination be a formal termination letter, 
although that facilitates proof.  In instances where the 
surrounding circumstances make clear that the employment 
relationship has ended, an affirmative termination has been found 
even in the absence of any communication, whether formal or 
informal.  See Economics Laboratory, 857 F.2d at 937-38; Harry 
Lunstead Designs, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 1163, 1164 (1984); Hercules, 
Inc., 225 N.L.R.B. 241, 242 (1976). 
 Cavert produced no evidence of any specific 
communication with Morris regarding his termination.  Cavert 
points to the facts, which the Board does not dispute, that 
Morris never contacted Cavert to express a desire or ability to 
return to work during the five months between his injury and the 
election; was instructed by Cavert to stop contacting the 
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company; was sent the July 30, 1993 letter terminating his health 
insurance and failed to respond to it; and that Morris's name was 
removed from the payroll.  The hearing officer found these facts 
did not show affirmative termination.   
 We consider them seriatim in light of the relevant 
evidence.  Clearly, Cavert cannot establish an affirmative 
termination simply by showing a lack of communication between the 
parties.  Under the circumstances of this case, the mere fact 
that Morris did not contact the company to discuss his desire or 
ability to return to work is not probative of his termination of 
employment, voluntary or not.  The hearing officer found that 
Morris was never told by a doctor that he could return to work, a 
finding supported by substantial evidence.  The doctor who saw 
Morris the day after the injury had written a note that Morris 
was "unable to work until further notice."  SA. at 6.  Although 
the independent physician who examined Morris in September 
advised the company he was released for light duty, the hearing 
officer found credible Morris's testimony that he never knew of 
that recommendation until he reviewed the doctor's report in 
preparation for the hearing.  There is no evidence to the 
contrary, and we have no reason to disturb this credibility 
determination. 
 The hearing officer also found that although "Morris 
has not contacted the Employer to update the Employer on his 
condition, or to inform the Employer when he will be able to 
return to work," it was uncontroverted "that Morris was told some 
time in September by an executive assistant to stop contacting 
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the Employer."  App. at 102.  Furthermore, the communication that 
did occur between the parties did not manifest an intent to 
terminate the employment.  There is no evidence that at the time 
that Morris was directed not to contact the company, any of the 
representatives of the company made any statement to Morris about 
the status of his job. 
 Cavert would have us draw the inference from the COBRA 
letter, read in conjunction with the notice that accompanied it, 
that Morris's employment had been terminated.  However, the 
letter contained no direct statement to that effect.  Moreover, 
Swimmer himself testified that at the time he sent the COBRA 
letter his purpose in sending the letter was to persuade Morris 
to come back to work, not to terminate his employment, and that 
he did not then view Morris's employment as terminated. 
 Having no basis in the record to find that there was 
any direct communication of a termination of Morris's employment 
relationship, we consider whether the totality of the 
circumstances made clear that there had been a termination of the 
employment relationship--what this court previously referred to 
as a "constructive termination."  See Economics Laboratory, 857 
F.2d at 937.  
 Cavert argues that termination is shown by the facts 
that Morris cleaned out his locker a week after his injury and 
that his position was filled.  The evidence as to whether Morris 
cleaned out his locker is inconclusive, however, and the hearing 
officer made no relevant finding.  Although Morris, in listing 
all of his contact with the company following his injury, 
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testified that he visited the plant several times in the weeks 
following his injury, he did not state he cleaned out or even 
retrieved items from his locker during those visits.  In fact, 
Morris's only reference to visiting his locker was that he went 
to the plant to retrieve his radio from his locker in December 
1993, some five months after the injury.  Swimmer's testimony 
that when he saw Morris at the plant one week after the accident 
Morris told him "he was cleaning out his locker -- he came to get 
some things from his locker," App. at 64, was uncorroborated. 
Since the hearing officer found some of Swimmer's testimony 
equivocal, we are not inclined to overturn her affirmative 
finding of no communication of termination on this inconclusive 
and contradicted evidence. 
 Finally, Cavert would have us find constructive 
termination based on Swimmer's testimony that Morris had been 
replaced 30 to 60 days after his injury.  However, the hearing 
officer gave little weight to the replacement noting Swimmer's 
testimony that most of Cavert's employees are cross-trained and 
perform interchangeable jobs.  It is not clear whether Cavert 
replaced Morris's particular position or simply hired an 
additional worker.  Indeed, the hearing officer considered 
Swimmer's testimony that Morris was replaced, that until then he 
had hoped Morris would return, that he sent the COBRA letter on 
July 30, 1993, nine days after Morris's injury, but that he 
considered Morris's employment terminated on September 1, 1993 
when his health insurance benefits ended, and that Morris could 
have returned for light duty work had he requested it sometime in 
25 
September.  The hearing officer then found all of the above 
testimony to be "very contradictory" and thus accorded it little, 
if any, weight.  App. at 104.  Cavert has offered no reason for 
us to disturb this credibility determination.   
 There are significant distinctions between the facts on 
this record and those before the Board and court in the 
constructive termination cases cited by Cavert.  In Hercules, 
Inc., 225 N.L.R.B. 241 (1976), the terms of an indefinite "leave 
of absence" granted an ill employee by the employer, as 
communicated to the employee, made it clear that in fact she had 
been terminated and invited to reapply when she recovered from 
her illness.  She was "expressly" told that when she recovered 
she would not get her job back immediately but would have to wait 
for an opening, and that on return she would have no more 
seniority rights than a new hire.  225 N.L.R.B. at 241-42. 
Shortly after the employee left, the employer notified its own 
headquarters that she had been terminated.  Under the clear terms 
of the personnel manual, she had by her absence lost her 
seniority and recall rights months before the election.  In light 
of all these circumstances, the Board found an affirmative 
termination despite the employer's failure to provide formal 
notification to the employee. 
 In Harry Lunstead Designs, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 1163 
(1984), after an employee had been out of work for three months 
due to an injury and the employer had determined that there was 
little chance she would return, the employer changed its payroll 
records and personnel files to indicate that she had been 
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terminated due to extended absence.  Under these circumstances, 
the Board found an affirmative termination despite the lack of 
evidence of formal notification of the employee.  270 N.L.R.B. at 
1164.  No comparable evidence is in this record, where the 
employer conceded that a change in payroll records does not 
necessarily signify termination. 
 In Economics Laboratory, where we held that employees 
in the employer's Long Term Disability (LTD) program had been 
constructively terminated and were therefore ineligible to vote 
under the Red Arrow standard despite the absence of any formal 
termination letter, there was other evidence to show termination. 
In order to participate in the LTD program employees had to be 
totally disabled such that they were unable to work for pay and 
absent from work due to disability for at least six months.  857 
F.2d at 933.  The company's written description of the LTD 
Program "suggest[ed] that the participants [were] no longer 
employees," inasmuch as it stated that "returning you to work 
with the company will depend on your successful rehabilitation 
and the availability of a job." Id.  The positions of LTD 
participants were filled with permanent replacements, and, 
although they retained seniority rights for three years, 
seniority was not a factor in rehiring.  Thus, a returning LTD 
participant was treated as a new applicant.  Additionally, LTD 
participants were removed from the payroll and the "Employee 
Status Report," the document issued by the company for all 
personnel decisions, and a person whose name did not appear on 
the Employee Status Report was not deemed an employee by the 
27 
company.  Id. at 937 n.11.  Finally, two of the LTD participants 
at issue in Economics Laboratory received social security 
disability benefits which required them to prove an inability to 
engage in any substantial gainful activity for at least twelve 
months.  Id. at 938.  Notwithstanding some parallels to the case 
before us, these critical differences convince us that Economics 
Laboratory does not control. 
 Cavert asks us to take judicial notice of the decision 
issued February 24, 1995 in Morris's workers' compensation case, 
ruling that he was "totally disabled from his pre-injury job as 
of July 22, 1993, to the present" and therefore eligible for 
benefits.  App. at 152.  This was issued a year and two months 
after the election and seven months after the Board ordered that 
Larry Morris's ballot be counted, and thus was not part of the 
record before the Board.  In reviewing the Board's voting 
eligibility determination, we must limit our consideration to the 
evidence available at the time of the election, see NLRB v. Jesse 
Jones Sausage Co., 309 F.2d 664, 666 (4th Cir. 1962), because 
that is the only evidence relevant in considering whether its 
findings are supported by the record.  Accordingly, the 1995 
workers' compensation decision is irrelevant.  
 Although we acknowledge that a different decision-maker 
could have decided on these facts that a constructive termination 
had occurred, it is not our role to substitute our judgment for 
that of the Board.  See NLRB v. L & J Equipment Co., 745 F.2d 
224, 230 (3d Cir. 1984).  There is substantial evidence in the 
record to support the hearing officer's determination that there 
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was no constructive termination of Morris's employment prior to 
the election, and therefore we will uphold the Board's decision.  
III. 
CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons set forth above, Cavert's petition for 
review will be denied and the Board's cross-petition for 
enforcement of its order will be granted. 
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